The Regional and Federal Dynamics of the German Debt during the First World War

with Marius Liebald (Goethe University)

and Uwe Walz (Goethe University)

December 15th, 2022

Historical Big-Data

Figuerola Institute, UCM3, and EurHisFirm

Pantelis Karapanagiotis (EBS University)

@pi_kappa_

Institutional Background

Institutional Background

Fiscal structure of the German Empire pre-WW1

  • The German empire was constituted in 1871 as a federal union of 25 Bundesstaaten/states.
  • Lower levels (regions and municipalities) had autonomous taxation power and bureaucracies in place to levy these taxes \(\rightarrow\) reflected the low level of power at the level of the Reich.
  • Initially, the primary source of income for the federal government was tariffs.
  • Trade tariffs increased significantly due to trade protectionism before the war.
  • Over time (1870-1914), the federal government imposed more and more indirect taxes, inheritance and wealth taxes.
  • Nevertheless, the Reich depended on transfers from the states.
  • A significant part of direct taxes remained with regions and municipalities (e.g., 75% in 1913)

Institutional Background

Expenditures at the different levels

  1. Reich

    • Focus on military expenditures.
    • Massive expansion over time.
    • E.g., expenditures (almost mainly due to military expenditures) tripled between 1888 and 1912 (in real terms).
    • Only partially covered by taxes and other income.
  2. Regions and municipalities
    • Provision of local public goods (including social services) and infrastructure (electricity, water) at the lowest level of government (villages and cities): significant autonomy.
    • Fiscal rules based on local regimes.

Institutional Background

War-financing dynamics

  • War amplified the indebtednesses very much.

Institutional Background

War-financing dynamics

  • War amplified the indebtednesses very much.
  • Direct War financing almost entirely at the federal level.

Institutional Background

War-financing dynamics

  • War amplified the indebtednesses very much.
  • Direct War financing almost entirely at the federal level.
  • Huge increases in military expenditures financed with war bonds.
  • Further issue: war took much longer than expected.

Institutional Background

Reparations

  • Significant part of the Treaty of Versailles: Reparations which had to be paid by Germany to the Allies.
  • Huge controversies over the amount of reparations; the amount initially not fixed.
  • In 1921, reparations were fixed at 132bn Goldmark, roughly 250% of 1913 GNP.
  • In contrast to internal indebtedness: reparations had to be paid in foreign currency or in Gold.
  • Huge external burden.
  • Failure to comply with reparation payments in 1922 led to Ruhr occupation and "passive resistance", putting additional pressure on the federal government's budget.

Institutional Background

Monetary Regime

  • From 1870-1914, Germany was under the gold standard, essentially pinning down the amount of public money under circulation.
  • Reichsbank was under the federal government's control (Reichskanzler), but until 1914 de facto could not conduct its own policy.
  • This changed when the gold standard was abandoned in 1914.
  • Allowed monetization of internal debt, in particular after 1918.
  • More de jure autonomy of the Reichsbank in 1922 (Autonomiegesetz).
  • But, regions and local governments had no power to influence monetary policy.

Institutional Background

Fiscal and monetary regime changes after WW1

  • Fiscal policy:
    • Huge tax reform 1921 under Finance Minister Erzberger: primary tax reform in a century.
    • Changed fiscal federalism on the tax side upside down: local levels of government lost income sources and autonomy \(\rightarrow\) massive fiscal centralization.
    • Shift of tax base towards the federal government.
    • Introduction of a progressive income tax.

Institutional Background

Fiscal and monetary regime changes after WW1

  • Fiscal policy:
    • Huge tax reform 1921 under Finance Minister Erzberger: primary tax reform in a century.
    • Changed fiscal federalism on the tax side upside down: local levels of government lost income sources and autonomy \(\rightarrow\) massive fiscal centralization.
    • Shift of tax base towards the federal government.
    • Introduction of a progressive income tax.
  • Monetary policy:
    • Fiat money regime; no gold anchor anymore.
    • Further monetization of government debt issued by all administration levels.

Institutional Background

Institutional Background

Debt governance

  • Local states and municipalities had the power and autonomy to issue bonds.
  • They were responsible for serving and repaying their debt.
  • By law, all issued securities had to be listed.

Institutional Background

Federal

Debt governance

  • After the war, internal government debt exceeded GNP by far.

Institutional Background

Federal

Debt governance

  • After the war, internal government debt exceeded GNP by far.
  • Debt monetization by Reichsbank in the early post-war years led to a reduction of debt/GNP below 1.

Institutional Background

Regional

Debt governance

  • Regions could not directly and independently monetize their debt.

Institutional Background

Regional

Debt governance

  • Regions could not directly and independently monetize their debt.
  • Significant growth rates of indebtedness (e.g., Frankfurt debt).

Institutional Background

Regional

Debt governance

  • Regions could not directly and independently monetize their debt.
  • Significant growth rates of indebtedness (e.g., Frankfurt debt).
  • Significant municipality debt-to-income ratios.
  • No evidence for insolvencies of Bundesstaaten or cities.
  • Maybe because the federal government bailed them out indirectly later on?
  • Potential question: are these debt dynamics sustainable?

Institutional Background

Debt dynamics

  • Initially (1875), the German Empire started essentially debt-free (cf. Ritschl, 1996)
  • This changed significantly in the subsequent decades
  • In particular, this was due to the mix of always increasing expenditures at the federal level and the weak income sources of the federal government
  • The development of debt at the Reich level as a percentage of GNP (cf. Ritschl, 1996):

    1885 1890 1900 1913
    37 50 51 63
  • But according to Broeck & James (2019):
    • At the end of March 1914, sovereign debt amounted to less than 10 percent of GDP; more than 90 percent was long-term loans.
    • By 1919, war-related debt represented more than 50 percent of GDP; almost 40 percent was short-term.
  • Contradictions in the literature; we should address this with our data !?

Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [Bt] Past Debt [Bt-1] Interest [rtBt-1] Total Expenditure [Tt] Revenues [Rt]

$B_{t}$
$=$
$B_{t-1}$
$-$
$R_{t}$
$+$
$T_{t}$

Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [Bt] Past Debt [Bt-1] Interest [rtBt-1] Total Expenditure [Tt] Revenues [Rt]

$B_{t}$
$=$
$B_{t-1}$
$-$
$R_{t}$
$+$
$T_{t}$

Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [Bt] Past Debt [Bt-1] Interest [rtBt-1] Primary Expenditure [Et] Revenues [Rt]

$B_{t}$
$=$
$B_{t-1}$
$-$
$R_{t}$
$+$
$E_{t}$
$+$
$r_{t}$
$B_{t-1}$

Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [Bt] Past Debt [Bt-1] Interest [rtBt-1] Primary Deficit [Dt]

$B_{t}$
$=$
$B_{t-1}$
$+$
$D_{t}$
$+$
$r_{t}$
$B_{t-1}$

Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [Bt] Past Debt [Bt-1] Interest [rtBt-1] Primary Deficit [Dt]

$\Delta B_{t}$
$=$
$D_{t}$
$+$
$r_{t}$
$B_{t-1}$

Per Capita Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [bt] Past Debt [bt-1] Interest [rtbt-1] Primary Deficit [dt]

$\Delta b_{t}$
$=$
$d_{t}$
$+$
$r_{t}$
$b_{t-1}$

Per Capita Debt Dynamics

Debt Today [bt] Past Debt [bt-1] Interest [(rt-gt)bt-1] Primary Deficit [dt]

$\Delta b_{t}$
$=$
$d_{t}$
$+$
$($
$r_{t}$
$-$
$g_{t}$
$)$
$b_{t-1}$

Interest Rates

  • The dynamics are based real interest rates, i.e.,
    $\Delta b_{t}$
    $=$
    $d_{t}$
    $+$
    $($
    $r_{t}$
    $-$
    $g_{t}$
    $)$
    $b_{t-1}$
  • But, using Fisher's equation
    $r_{t}$
    $=$
    $i_{t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{t}$

Interest Rates

  • The dynamics can be written using nominal interest rates and inflation
    $\Delta b_{t}$
    $=$
    $d_{t}$
    $+$
    $($
    $i_{t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{t}$
    $-$
    $g_{t}$
    $)$
    $b_{t-1}$

Federal Dynamics

  • In summary, at the federal level
    $\Delta b_{t}$
    $=$
    $d_{t}$
    $+$
    $($
    $i_{t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{t}$
    $-$
    $g_{t}$
    $)$
    $b_{t-1}$
  • What about the regional debt dynamics?

Regional Debt Dynamics

  • What about the regional debt dynamics?

    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $d_{j,t}$
    $+$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

Regional Deficits

  • Reshuffling gives
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

Data Requirements

  • What data do we need to calculate the regional deficits?
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

Data Requirements

  • What data do we need to calculate the regional deficits?
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

  • Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)

Data Requirements

  • What data do we need to calculate the regional deficits?
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

  • Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  • Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)

Data Requirements

  • What data do we need to calculate the regional deficits?
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

  • Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  • Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  • Output growth rate, \(g_{j,t} = \cfrac{Y_{j,t}}{Y_{j,t-1}}-1\)

Data Requirements

  • What data do we need to calculate the regional deficits?
    $d_{j,t}$
    $=$
    $\Delta b_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $($
    $i_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $\pi_{j,t}$
    $-$
    $g_{j,t}$
    $)$
    $b_{j,t-1}$

  • Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  • Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  • Output growth rate, \(g_{j,t} = \cfrac{Y_{j,t}}{Y_{j,t-1}}-1\)
  • Debt-to-Output ratio, \(b_{j,t}\)
    • Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
    • Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

Data Requirements

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, 1886-1923

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{\color{BURLYWOOD}{j},t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{\color{BURLYWOOD}{j},t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{\color{BURLYWOOD}{j},t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{\color{BURLYWOOD}{j},t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, 1886-1923

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,\color{BURLYWOOD}{t}}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,\color{BURLYWOOD}{t}}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,\color{BURLYWOOD}{t}}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,\color{BURLYWOOD}{t}}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, 1886-1923

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, 1886-1923

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, 1886-1923

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, (1886-1923)
  • Holtfrerich (1980)

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, (1886-1923)
  • Holtfrerich (1980)
  • Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, (1880-1923)

Data Sources

  1. Nominal interest rate, \(i_{j,t}\)
  2. Debt, \(B_{j,t}\)
  3. Inflation, \(\pi_{j,t}\)
  4. Output, \(Y_{j,t}\)

  • Appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, (1886-1923)
  • Holtfrerich (1980)
  • Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, (1880-1923)
  • Hoffmann (1965) and Burhop & Wolff (2005)

First Observations

Regional Interest Rates

Outstanding Debt of

1913

Regional Interest Rates

Outstanding Debt of

1914

Regional Interest Rates

Outstanding Debt of

1919

Regional Price Movements

Beef, Pork, Butter, Ox, and Flour

Debt Comparison

Nomimal Outstanding Debt

(Non-War)

Debt Comparison

Nomimal Outstanding Debt

(Total)

Debt Comparison

Nomimal Outstanding Debt

(War)

The Regional and Federal Dynamics of the German Debt during the First World War

  • Micro Data:
    • German debt and interest rates from the appendices of Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1886-1923) at a municipality, province, state, and federal level.
    • Regional prices and output from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, (1880-1923).
  • Methodology (to do):
    • Use the debt dynamics equation to calculate primary deficits at various administrative levels.
    • Calculate the spread in deficit trends between the federal and non-federal levels.
    • Control for war bonds.
    • Calculate the unexplained difference.
  • Open Questions:
    • What part of the unexplained difference constitutes the strategic component of indebtedness?
    • Did regional debt heterogeneity contribute to the collapse of the German economy after the war?
    • Can the differences in the evolution of regional and federal debts explain the tax reform of 1921?

References

Broeck, M. D., & James, H. (2019). Germany in the interbellum: Camouflaging sovereign debt. In Debt and entanglements between the wars (p. Chapter 6). USA: International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513511795.071.ch006
Burhop, C., & Wolff, G. B. (2005). A Compromise Estimate of German Net National Product, 1851 1913, and its Implications for Growth and Business Cycles. The Journal of Economic History, 65(03). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050705000239
Hoffmann, W. G. (1965). Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Springer-Verlag.
Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1980). Die deutsche Inflation 1914-1923: Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive. Berlin ; New York: de Gruyter.
Ritschl, A. (1996). Sustainability of high public debt: What the historical record shows (CEPR Discussion Papers No. 1357). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.